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Abstract	  	  	   The	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  1991	  gave	  birth	  to	  many	  new	  independent	  states.	  Many	  of	  these	  states	  have	  developed	  regimes	  with	  both	  democratic	  and	  authoritarian	  elements,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  transitional	  democracies	  or	  transitional	  authoritarian	  regimes.	  Many	  scholars	  look	  at	  how	  to	  classify	  these	  regimes,	  but	  not	  at	  how	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  regime	  lead	  to	  its	  stability.	  Why	  are	  post-­‐Soviet	  regimes	  stable?	  Discovering	  what	  makes	  these	  regimes	  stable	  can	  help	  us	  establish	  behavioral	  norms	  and	  aid	  us	  in	  future	  political	  and	  economic	  endeavors	  with	  the	  country	  in	  question.	  Although	  evaluating	  each	  element	  of	  hybrid-­‐regimes	  would	  be	  ideal	  due	  to	  the	  current	  lack	  of	  information	  on	  hybrid-­‐regimes	  in	  general,	  I	  would	  look	  at	  three	  main	  elements	  to	  determine	  their	  link	  to	  stability:	  civil	  society,	  effective	  (internal)	  governance,	  and	  international	  power.	  This	  study	  would	  help	  future	  policy	  makes	  and	  scholars	  alike	  to	  form	  opinions	  about,	  make	  decisions	  about	  and	  plan	  interactions	  with	  hybrid-­‐regimes	  with	  solid	  information	  at	  their	  disposal.	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Introduction	  
	   The	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  1991	  gave	  birth	  to	  a	  plethora	  of	  newly	  independent	  states.	  Many	  of	  these	  states	  developed	  regimes	  with	  elements	  found	  in	  democratic	  and	  authoritarian	  regimes.	  They	  are	  not	  democratic	  or	  authoritarian,	  however,	  but	  rather	  have	  some	  elements	  from	  each	  in	  addition	  to	  other	  elements.	  Why	  do	  post-­‐Soviet	  regimes	  remain	  stable?	  Most	  scholars	  expected	  these	  regimes	  to	  democratize	  or	  turn	  fully	  authoritarian.	  Some	  believe	  they	  are	  caught	  in	  transition	  between	  the	  two.	  1Either	  way,	  these	  regimes	  are	  fairly	  stable	  and	  have	  been	  since	  independence.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  why	  these	  regimes	  are	  stable,	  I	  would	  examine	  the	  level	  of	  development	  and	  the	  size	  of	  civil	  society	  within	  each	  regime.	  I	  would	  observe	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  internal	  governance,	  and	  I	  would	  evaluate	  the	  power	  of	  each	  government	  with	  respect	  to	  security,	  alliances,	  etc.	  within	  the	  international	  arena.	  The	  countries	  I	  would	  examine	  are	  Russia,	  Ukraine,	  and	  Georgia.	  	  
Why	  Hybrid-­‐Regimes?	  
	   These	  regimes	  warrant	  significant	  and	  detailed	  study	  for	  two	  major	  reasons.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  the	  predictions	  that	  highly	  educated	  scholars	  and	  theorists	  made	  twenty	  years	  ago	  proved	  to	  be	  incorrect.	  They	  predicted	  that	  these	  regimes	  would	  transition	  fully	  into	  authoritarian	  or	  democratic	  regimes—not	  stop	  halfway	  between	  the	  two	  and	  definitely	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Matthijs	  Bogaards,	  "How	  to	  Classify	  Hybrid	  Regimes?	  Defective	  Democracy	  and	  Electoral	  Authoritarianism."	  Democratization	  16,	  no.	  2	  (April	  2009):	  399-­‐423.	  doi:10.1080/13510340902777800	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become	  their	  own	  type	  of	  regime.	  The	  second	  reason	  is	  that	  these	  regimes	  could	  last	  for	  a	  long	  while.	  If	  we	  are	  to	  interact	  with	  them	  politically	  and	  economically,	  we	  need	  to	  understand	  how	  they	  behave,	  their	  level	  of	  stability,	  and	  the	  probability	  of	  their	  survival	  no	  matter	  the	  classification	  of	  the	  regime.	  	  	  	   I	  will	  begin	  by	  presenting	  the	  current	  debate	  amongst	  scholars	  within	  the	  discipline.	  Next,	  I	  will	  present	  the	  literature	  that	  led	  me	  to	  my	  hypotheses.	  Following	  my	  literature	  review,	  I	  will	  identify	  my	  dependent	  and	  independent	  variable(s).	  Finally,	  I	  will	  provide	  the	  cases	  that	  I	  would	  review,	  and	  will	  conclude	  with	  my	  final	  remarks	  and	  observations.	  	  	  
Background:	  The	  Scholars’	  Debate	  	   There	  is	  very	  little	  research	  on	  the	  actual	  institutions	  of	  each	  individual	  post-­‐Soviet	  hybrid-­‐regime	  and	  even	  less	  on	  the	  way	  they	  function	  to	  promote	  or	  deter	  stability.	  There	  is,	  however,	  a	  lot	  of	  literature	  on	  how	  to	  define	  a	  hybrid-­‐regime	  and	  speculation	  about	  where	  they	  fall	  on	  the	  political	  spectrum.	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  best	  guide	  my	  research	  design,	  I	  have	  looked	  at	  a	  number	  of	  scholars	  and	  theorists	  who	  have	  attempted	  to	  define	  hybrid-­‐regimes	  as	  well	  as	  other	  regimes	  that	  look	  similar	  to	  hybrid-­‐regimes.	  I	  will	  use	  the	  literature	  that	  defines	  these	  regimes	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  the	  hybrid-­‐regime	  and	  perhaps	  specific	  elements	  critical	  to	  its	  stability	  and	  its	  classification.	  	  Many	  scholars	  call	  attention	  to	  the	  use	  of	  language	  to	  describe	  hybrid-­‐regimes	  such	  as	  a	  partial	  democracy	  (also	  known	  as	  a	  semi-­‐democracy,	  illiberal	  democracy,	  transitioning	  democracy,	  etc.)	  or	  an	  electoral	  authoritarian	  regime	  (other	  names	  include:	  competitive	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authoritarian	  regime,	  semi-­‐authoritarian	  regime,	  etc.).	  2The	  regime	  that	  these	  words	  try	  to	  describe	  is	  in	  fact	  nondemocratic	  and	  not	  authoritarian,	  ergo	  the	  word	  “hybrid”	  is	  used	  as	  a	  broad	  term	  for	  a	  different	  type	  of	  regime.	  I	  will	  give	  definitions	  of	  both	  democracy	  and	  types	  of	  authoritarianism	  to	  better	  demonstrate	  the	  differences	  between	  hybrids,	  democracies,	  and	  authoritarian	  regimes.	  	  Democracy	  is,	  “a	  system	  of	  governance	  in	  which	  rulers	  are	  held	  accountable	  for	  their	  actions	  in	  the	  public	  realm	  by	  citizens,	  acting	  independently	  through	  competition	  and	  cooperation	  of	  their	  elected	  representatives.”3	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  government	  that	  maintains	  the	  following:	  free,	  fair,	  competitive,	  regular	  elections;	  transparency	  and	  accountability;	  a	  developed	  civil	  society;	  rule	  of	  law;	  and	  protection	  of	  civil	  rights	  and	  civil	  liberties,	  is	  a	  democracy.	  Therefore,	  according	  to	  this	  definition,	  any	  regime	  that	  demonstrates	  a	  few	  of	  the	  following	  could	  be	  a	  semi,	  illiberal,	  transitioning,	  or	  partial	  democracy.	  However,	  the	  assumption	  with	  all	  of	  these	  labels	  is	  that	  the	  regime	  is	  moving	  toward	  a	  consolidated	  democracy	  and	  for	  some	  reason	  or	  another	  was	  arrested	  in	  this	  transition.	  	  
	   In	  1996,	  Juan	  J.	  Linz	  coined	  the	  term	  “authoritarianism”	  to	  identify	  a	  form	  of	  polity	  that	  existed	  outside	  the	  traditional	  spectrum	  of	  democracy	  to	  totalitarianism.	  He	  defined	  authoritarianism	  as	  “political	  systems	  with	  limited,	  not	  responsible,	  political	  pluralism,	  without	  elaborate	  and	  guiding	  ideology,	  but	  with	  distinctive	  mentalities,	  without	  extensive	  nor	  intensive	  political	  mobilization,	  except	  at	  some	  points	  in	  their	  development,	  and	  in	  which	  a	  leader	  or	  occasionally	  a	  small	  group	  exercises	  power	  within	  formally	  ill-­‐defined	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Matthijs	  Bogaards,	  "How	  to	  Classify	  Hybrid	  Regimes?	  Defective	  Democracy	  and	  Electoral	  Authoritarianism."	  Democratization	  16,	  no.	  2	  (April	  2009):	  399-­‐423.	  doi:10.1080/13510340902777800	  3	  Philippe	  C.	  Schmitter	  and	  Terry	  Lynn	  Karl,	  "What	  Democracy	  Is.	  .	  .	  and	  Is	  Not."	  Journal	  of	  
Democracy	  2,	  no.	  3	  (1991):	  75-­‐88.	  doi:10.1353/jod.1991.0033	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limits	  but	  actually	  quite	  predictable	  ones.”4	  Linz	  and	  Stepan	  broadened	  the	  political	  categorization	  spectrum	  with	  their	  book,	  Problems	  of	  Democratic	  Transition	  and	  
Consolidation,	  1996,	  more	  specifically	  the	  chapter	  titled	  Modern	  Nondemocratic	  Regimes,	  from	  three	  paradigm	  typologies	  to	  five	  paradigm	  typologies—democracy,	  authoritarianism,	  post-­‐totalitarianism,	  totalitarianism,	  and	  sultanism.	  They	  argue	  that	  although	  the	  tripartite	  typology	  was	  once	  very	  useful,	  it	  is	  now	  an	  obstacle	  to	  categorizing	  and	  recognizing	  regimes	  that	  do	  not	  fall	  within	  one	  of	  the	  three	  categories	  or	  that	  are	  mistakenly	  placed	  within	  the	  three.5	  As	  sultanism	  is	  not	  present	  within	  the	  post-­‐Soviet	  states	  that	  I	  plan	  to	  research,	  I	  will	  not	  include	  commentary	  on	  this	  section	  of	  their	  work.	  	  Linz	  and	  Stepan	  define	  post-­‐totalitarianism	  as	  a	  paradigm	  of	  three	  sub-­‐categories:	  early	  post-­‐totalitarianism,	  frozen	  post-­‐totalitarianism,	  and	  mature	  post-­‐totalitarianism.	  Each	  differs	  from	  one	  another	  in	  at	  least	  one	  key	  element,	  but	  they	  all	  possess,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  the	  elements	  of	  post-­‐totalitarianism,	  which	  are:	  limited,	  but	  not	  responsible	  social,	  economic	  and	  institutional	  pluralism;	  almost	  no	  political	  pluralism,	  presence	  of	  “second	  economy”,	  guiding	  ideology	  still	  present	  and	  part	  of	  social	  reality,	  progressive	  loss	  of	  interest	  by	  leaders	  and	  non-­‐leaders	  involved	  in	  organizing	  mobilization,	  and	  growing	  emphasis	  on	  personal	  security	  within	  the	  political	  elite.6	  Linz	  and	  Stepan	  argue	  that	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Juan	  J.	  Linz	  and	  Alfred	  C.	  Stepan,	  "Modern	  Nondemocratic	  Regimes."	  1996.	  In	  Problems	  of	  
Democratic	  Transition	  and	  Consolidation:	  Southern	  Europe,	  South	  America,	  and	  Post-­‐
communist	  Europe,	  38-­‐54	  (Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1996)	  5	  Juan	  J.	  Linz	  and	  Alfred	  C.	  Stepan,	  "Modern	  Nondemocratic	  Regimes."	  1996.	  In	  Problems	  of	  
Democratic	  Transition	  and	  Consolidation:	  Southern	  Europe,	  South	  America,	  and	  Post-­‐
communist	  Europe,	  38-­‐54	  (Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1996)	  6	  Juan	  J.	  Linz	  and	  Alfred	  C.	  Stepan,	  "Modern	  Nondemocratic	  Regimes."	  1996.	  In	  Problems	  of	  
Democratic	  Transition	  and	  Consolidation:	  Southern	  Europe,	  South	  America,	  and	  Post-­‐
communist	  Europe,	  38-­‐54	  (Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1996)	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growing	  pluralism	  within	  post-­‐totalitarian	  regimes	  makes	  them	  vulnerable	  while	  it	  gives	  strength	  to	  the	  “second	  culture”	  of	  democratic	  opposition.	  	  Their	  division	  of	  the	  traditional	  tripartite	  typology	  allows	  for	  easier	  classification	  and	  identification	  of	  institutions	  within	  regimes	  or	  of	  regimes	  themselves.	  Their	  work	  is	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  and	  identifying	  the	  contributors	  to	  stability	  within	  post-­‐Soviet	  states.	  It	  also	  opened	  the	  door	  to	  identifying	  regimes	  as	  something	  other	  than	  democratic	  or	  authoritarian.	  Many	  scholars	  still	  use	  a	  spectrum	  where	  democracy	  falls	  on	  one	  end	  and	  authoritarian	  on	  the	  other.	  By	  shoving	  regimes	  into	  categorizations	  in	  which	  they	  do	  not	  fit,	  such	  as	  post-­‐Soviet,	  and	  even	  post-­‐Communist,	  hybrid-­‐regimes,	  we	  set	  ourselves	  up	  for	  ignorant	  behavior.	  Classification	  of	  a	  regime	  allows	  us	  to	  be	  familiar	  with	  the	  behavior	  of	  a	  regime,	  which	  in	  turn	  enables	  us	  to	  make	  policy	  regarding	  that	  regime,	  to	  interact	  with	  that	  regime,	  and	  to	  make	  guided	  and	  knowledgeable	  assumptions	  about	  that	  regime.	  When	  we	  try	  to	  fit	  a	  regime	  into	  a	  category	  in	  which	  it	  does	  not	  belong,	  we	  eliminate	  the	  opportunity	  to	  make	  the	  best	  decision	  with	  the	  most	  information.	  	  Steven	  Levitsky	  and	  Lucan	  A.	  Way	  look	  at	  the	  way	  in	  which	  regimes	  are	  defined.	  They	  note	  that	  there	  is	  a	  distinct	  democratic	  bias	  in	  how	  we	  classify	  regimes,	  for	  example	  “partial	  democracy,	  illiberal	  democracy,	  transitional	  democracy,	  semi	  democracy,	  pseudo	  democracy,	  etc.”	  These	  labels	  assume	  that	  the	  regime	  in	  question	  is	  a	  “diminished”	  form	  of	  democracy.7	  Matthijs	  Bogaards	  stated,	  “Current	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  hybrid	  regimes	  are	  limited	  by	  their	  focus	  on	  a	  single	  root	  concept….	  one	  takes	  democracy	  as	  the	  root	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Steven	  Levitsky	  and	  Lucan	  Way."The	  Rise	  of	  Competitive	  Authoritarianism."	  Journal	  of	  
Democracy	  13,	  no.	  2	  (2002):	  51-­‐65.	  doi:10.1353/jod.2002.0026	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concept,	  the	  other	  authoritarianism.”8	  Therefore,	  the	  study	  always	  maintains	  one	  bias	  or	  the	  other.	  Terms	  such	  as	  “hybrid”,	  “semi-­‐authoritarian”,	  or	  “partly-­‐free”	  brush	  over	  important	  aspects	  and	  differences	  between	  regimes.	  By	  pushing	  regimes	  into	  residual	  categories,	  we	  limit	  our	  understanding	  of	  them	  as	  well	  as	  the	  potential	  to	  interact	  with	  them.	  Levitsky	  and	  Way	  propose	  the	  term	  “competitive	  authoritarianism”	  as	  a	  subcategory	  for	  “hybrid-­‐regimes”	  implying	  that	  there	  are	  multiple	  types	  of	  hybrid-­‐regimes.	  Competitive	  authoritarianism	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  following:	  formal	  democratic	  institutions	  are	  the	  widely	  recognized	  means	  of	  exercising	  political	  authority,	  incumbents	  often	  violate	  these	  rules	  so	  often,	  though,	  that	  the	  regime	  cannot	  meet	  the	  required	  standard	  for	  democratic	  recognition.9	  	  Levitsky	  and	  Way	  claim	  that	  Russia	  under	  Vladimir	  Putin,	  Ukraine	  under	  Leonid	  Kravchuk	  and	  Armenia	  through	  the	  90s	  were	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes.10	  They	  agree	  with	  Linz	  in	  that	  these	  states	  seem	  to	  be	  more	  of	  a	  diminished	  authoritarian	  regime	  than	  a	  diminished	  democratic	  one.	  	  Much	  of	  this	  literature	  deals	  with	  how	  to	  classify	  these	  regimes.	  But,	  in	  the	  meantime,	  these	  regimes	  continue	  to	  rule	  and	  exist	  despite	  their	  lack	  of	  “democratic	  institutions”	  or	  “authoritarian	  elements.”	  We	  must	  begin	  to	  think	  of	  these	  elements	  such	  as	  competitive	  electoral	  processes,	  presidencies,	  civil	  society,	  etc.	  as	  components	  that	  happen	  to	  be	  in	  a	  democracy	  or	  an	  authoritarian	  regime	  or	  a	  hybrid-­‐regime.	  But,	  the	  presence	  of	  these	  elements	  does	  not	  make	  a	  regime	  a	  diminished	  form	  of	  regimes	  that	  have	  similar	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Matthijs	  Bogaards,	  "How	  to	  Classify	  Hybrid	  Regimes?	  Defective	  Democracy	  and	  Electoral	  Authoritarianism."	  Democratization	  16,	  no.	  2	  (April	  2009):	  399-­‐423.	  doi:10.1080/13510340902777800	  9	  Steven	  Levitsky	  and	  Lucan	  Way."The	  Rise	  of	  Competitive	  Authoritarianism."	  Journal	  of	  
Democracy	  13,	  no.	  2	  (2002):	  51-­‐65.	  doi:10.1353/jod.2002.0026	  10	  Steven	  Levitsky	  and	  Lucan	  Way."The	  Rise	  of	  Competitive	  Authoritarianism."	  Journal	  of	  
Democracy	  13,	  no.	  2	  (2002):	  51-­‐65.	  doi:10.1353/jod.2002.0026	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elements.	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  the	  various	  combinations	  of	  these	  features	  that	  determines	  the	  stability	  or	  success	  of	  a	  regime.	  The	  combination	  of	  institutions	  that	  we	  label	  as	  democracy	  seems	  to	  do	  well,	  but	  so	  too	  does	  other	  regimes.	  	  	  
Literature	  Review	  
	  
	   Looking	  at	  post-­‐Soviet	  hybrid-­‐regimes	  based	  on	  their	  components,	  not	  based	  on	  other	  regimes,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  purposes	  of	  Leah	  Gilbert	  and	  Payam	  Mohseni’s	  research.	  “Rather	  than	  place	  regimes	  on	  a	  single	  continuum	  from	  authoritarianism	  to	  democracy,	  a	  configurative	  approach	  provides	  scholars	  with	  an	  alternative	  view	  of	  political	  systems	  by	  highlighting	  the	  multiple	  dimensions	  of	  regimes.”11	  They	  evaluate	  hybrid-­‐regimes	  based	  on	  competitiveness,	  civil	  liberties,	  and	  tutelary	  interference.	  Gilbert	  and	  Mohseni	  are	  some	  of	  the	  first	  scholars	  to	  look	  at	  hybrid-­‐regimes	  based	  on	  their	  components	  and	  not	  on	  their	  likeness	  to	  another	  regime.	  Below	  is	  a	  visual	  aid	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  continuum	  about	  which	  they	  speak.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Leah	  Gilbert	  and	  Payam	  Mohseni.	  "Beyond	  Authoritarianism:	  The	  Conceptualization	  of	  Hybrid	  Regimes."	  Studies	  in	  Comparative	  International	  Development	  46,	  no.	  3	  (July	  28,	  2011):	  270-­‐97.	  doi:10.1007/s12116-­‐011-­‐9088-­‐x	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Fig. 1 Conceptual map of the current field of regime types (Gilbert and Mohseni, 2011) 
 
 Regimes	  have	  many	  dimensions	  and	  many	  components.	  The	  concept	  of	  putting	  all	  regimes	  into	  a	  few	  defined	  categories,	  although	  ideal,	  is	  not	  possible	  nor	  is	  it	  responsible.	  We	  inevitably	  overlook	  critical	  aspects	  of	  regimes	  when	  we	  attempt	  to	  push	  them	  into	  categories	  in	  which	  they	  do	  not	  belong.	  Gilbert	  and	  Mohseni	  provide	  a	  list	  of	  all	  hybrid-­‐regimes	  singled	  out	  based	  on	  a	  nuanced	  framework	  that	  uses	  the	  three	  concepts	  mentioned	  above:	  competitiveness,	  civil	  liberties,	  and	  tutelary	  interference.	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  approach	  hybrid-­‐regimes	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  components	  within	  them,	  but	  to	  help	  determine	  why	  they	  are	  stable	  rather	  than	  to	  classify	  them.	  Linz	  and	  Stepan	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  used	  a	  framework	  based	  on	  ideology,	  mobilization,	  leadership,	  and	  pluralism.	  Their	  study	  led	  me	  to	  the	  selection	  of	  my	  variables.	  I	  continue	  with	  their	  variables	  in	  my	  own	  study	  by	  grouping	  ideology,	  mobilization	  and	  pluralism	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  civil	  society.	  I	  look	  at	  leadership	  within	  the	  variables	  of	  
	   10	  
effective,	  internal	  governance	  and	  international	  power.	  Although	  they	  used	  these	  four	  concepts	  to	  place	  all	  regimes	  within	  one	  of	  four	  main	  categories	  (see	  Fig.	  2),	  their	  idea	  to	  use	  concepts,	  rather	  than	  the	  regimes	  themselves	  to	  categorize	  regimes	  should	  be	  continued	  with	  slight	  alterations.	  Instead	  of	  using	  the	  concepts	  to	  place	  a	  regime	  into	  one	  of	  four	  preconceived	  categories,	  it	  should	  be	  used	  to	  create	  new	  categories	  that	  truly	  define	  the	  dimensions	  of	  the	  regimes	  in	  question.	  If	  I	  were	  to	  continue	  to	  study	  hybrid-­‐regimes,	  I	  would	  delve	  into	  the	  classification	  argument	  using	  a	  similar	  approach.	  For	  this	  study,	  I	  will	  simply	  take	  inspiration	  from	  their	  variables	  and	  methods	  to	  help	  form	  my	  own	  research	  design.	  	  
 
Fig.	  2	  Property	  concept	  continuums	  for	  regime	  types	  (Linz	  2000;	  Linz	  and	  Stepan	  1996)	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   Another	  author	  whose	  work	  prompted	  me	  to	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  civil	  society	  is	  Olena	  Nikolayenko.	  She	  writes	  about	  youth	  movements	  in	  Serbia,	  and	  post-­‐Soviet	  Georgia	  and	  Ukraine.	  Her	  study	  examines	  the	  cross-­‐national	  similarities	  apparent	  in	  each.	  She	  argues	  that	  one	  of	  the	  main	  factors	  of	  the	  similar	  behavior	  of	  youth	  movements	  in	  each	  country	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  similar	  history	  of	  each	  country	  and	  the	  similar	  governments	  now	  found	  in	  these	  three	  post-­‐Soviet	  countries.	  Elaborating	  on	  the	  type	  of	  regime,	  she	  writes	  about	  the	  hybrid-­‐regime	  manifesting	  in	  each.	  She	  concludes	  that	  within	  these	  hybrid-­‐regimes,	  one	  can	  find	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  protest	  strategy	  different	  from	  those	  found	  in	  other	  current	  regimes.	  The	  difference	  lies	  in	  that	  autocratic	  states	  do	  not	  typically	  allow	  for	  protest	  (or	  pluralism	  as	  a	  form	  of	  opposition),	  and	  youth	  protest	  in	  democracy	  is	  rarer	  today.	  These	  youth	  movements	  utilize	  media	  (social	  and	  traditional)	  and	  technological	  communication	  (Facebook,	  Twitter,	  text	  messaging,	  etc.)	  in	  conjunction	  with	  avenues	  particular	  to	  youth	  such	  as	  music	  (rock	  concerts),	  art	  distribution	  (stickers	  and	  posters)	  and	  street	  performances	  to	  transmit	  their	  message	  to	  the	  government.12	  Their	  behavior	  demonstrates	  a	  semi-­‐permissive	  or	  completely	  permissive	  attitude	  of	  the	  government	  toward	  opposition	  groups	  and	  protest	  as	  well	  as	  mobilization	  of	  a	  young	  age	  group.	  Her	  work	  is	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  the	  behavior	  of	  hybrid-­‐regimes	  and	  the	  response	  of	  society	  toward	  these	  new	  regimes.	  The	  type	  of	  protests	  found	  in	  these	  regimes	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  types	  of	  protests	  allowed	  by	  the	  government	  and	  the	  level	  of	  freedoms	  permitted.	  The	  government’s	  response	  to	  these	  protests	  reveals	  the	  type	  of	  relationship	  the	  government	  has	  to	  the	  people.	  Her	  work	  has	  led	  me	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  civil	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Olena	  Nikolayenko,"The	  Revolt	  of	  the	  Post-­‐Soviet	  Generation:	  Youth	  Movements	  in	  Serbia,	  Georgia,	  and	  Ukraine."	  Comparative	  Politics	  39,	  no.	  2	  (January	  01,	  2007):	  169-­‐88.	  Accessed	  January	  28,	  2014.	  http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/20434032?ref=search-­‐gateway:2abb3a48343d012fe19b1d310ce83927	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society	  as	  a	  whole	  leads	  to	  a	  more	  stable	  government	  because	  it	  can	  allow	  for	  pluralism,	  mobilization	  and	  healthy	  opposition	  (competition).	  	  	   Much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  hybrid-­‐regimes	  or	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes,	  has	  looked	  at	  how	  to	  classify	  the	  regime,	  what	  led	  to	  its	  evolution,	  or	  why	  it	  is	  more	  or	  less	  democratic	  than	  the	  scholar	  would	  like	  the	  country	  in	  question	  to	  be.	  But	  there	  is	  very	  little	  literature	  on	  the	  actual	  institutions	  of	  these	  hybrid-­‐regimes	  and	  how	  well	  they	  function.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  there	  is	  very	  little	  information	  on	  these	  new	  institutions	  and	  how	  they	  contribute	  to	  their	  stability.	  Many	  scholars	  look	  at	  these	  regimes	  either	  expecting	  them	  to	  be	  democratic	  with	  some	  authoritarian	  elements,	  or	  authoritarian	  with	  some	  democratic	  elements.	  Either	  way,	  they	  are	  only	  one	  of	  two	  preconceived	  regimes	  and	  therefore	  seem	  doomed	  to	  fail	  if	  success	  is	  defined	  as	  full	  transformation.	  The	  assumption	  is	  often	  that	  if	  they	  fall	  somewhere	  in	  between	  the	  two	  ends	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  they	  are	  unstable.	  Scholars	  have	  conducted	  little	  research	  on	  the	  concepts	  and	  institutions	  within	  the	  hybrid-­‐regime	  and	  even	  less	  on	  how	  they	  affect	  stability	  within	  the	  hybrid-­‐regime.	  	  	  
My	  Hypotheses	  and	  Methodology:	  	   	  	   The	  dependent	  variable	  in	  my	  study	  is	  stability	  in	  post-­‐Soviet	  hybrid	  regimes.	  My	  independent	  variables	  are	  civil	  society,	  effective	  (internal)	  governance,	  and	  international	  power.	  I	  plan	  to	  look	  at	  these	  three	  elements	  within	  each	  regime	  to	  see	  how	  it	  connects	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  regime	  and	  the	  state	  as	  a	  whole.	  I	  use	  the	  word	  stability	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  state	  is	  not	  failing	  or	  failed,	  no	  violent	  regime	  changes	  have	  occurred	  since	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  USSR,	  and	  basic	  functions	  of	  the	  state	  are	  carried	  out.	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I	  hypothesize	  that	  post-­‐Soviet	  hybrid-­‐regimes	  with	  civil	  society	  are	  more	  stable	  than	  those	  without.	  By	  civil	  society,	  I	  mean	  the	  generally	  accepted	  concept	  of	  citizen	  participation	  in	  groups	  in	  and	  outside	  of	  government	  from	  local	  to	  national	  level.	  States	  that	  allow	  civil	  society	  permit	  participation	  in	  and	  paths	  for	  protest,	  for	  mobilization,	  and	  for	  coalition	  amongst	  citizens.	  Influential	  groups	  such	  as	  youth	  leagues,	  adult	  leagues,	  women’s	  groups,	  national	  associations,	  etc.	  lead	  to	  a	  feeling	  of	  involvement	  and	  act	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  pressure	  valve	  for	  dissent.	  The	  presence	  of	  a	  civil	  society	  demonstrates	  a	  tolerance	  for	  mobilization	  and	  for	  dissidence	  or	  possible	  opposition	  within	  the	  country	  on	  the	  part	  of	  government.	  	  I	  will	  measure	  the	  presence	  of	  civil	  society	  through	  the	  use	  of	  both	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  data.	  The	  number	  of	  registered	  legitimate	  organizations	  and	  groups	  within	  the	  country	  will	  provide	  a	  base	  number	  of	  associations	  from	  which	  to	  begin	  measuring	  the	  civil	  society	  present	  in	  the	  country	  in	  question.	  Next	  I	  will	  evaluate	  the	  quality	  and	  level	  of	  government	  interference	  within	  a	  set	  number	  of	  randomly	  selected	  groups.	  Using	  literature	  about	  the	  groups	  specifically,	  interviews	  with	  members	  of	  the	  groups	  and	  members	  of	  society	  outside	  of	  the	  groups	  (to	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  others	  look	  at	  the	  groups	  in	  question),	  I	  would	  try	  to	  define	  the	  behavior	  of	  these	  groups.	  If	  these	  groups	  seem	  to	  act	  like	  a	  pressure	  valve	  as	  well	  as	  an	  avenue	  through	  which	  to	  oppose	  or	  promote	  certain	  political	  and	  moral	  beliefs,	  they	  could	  help	  lead	  to	  the	  stability	  we	  find	  within	  these	  regimes.	  	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  post-­‐Soviet	  hybrid-­‐regimes	  with	  effective,	  internal	  governance	  are	  more	  stable.	  In	  other	  words,	  an	  effective	  government	  can	  and	  will,	  ideally,	  provide	  necessary	  services	  for	  its	  people	  such	  as	  security	  and	  protection,	  provision	  and	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enforcement	  of	  laws,	  some	  form	  of	  welfare	  system,	  and	  protection	  of	  civil	  rights	  and	  civil	  liberties.	  Not	  all	  of	  these	  elements	  are	  required	  for	  effective	  governance,	  but	  the	  presence	  of	  at	  least	  security,	  protection	  and	  a	  set	  of	  codified	  laws	  (constitution)	  must	  be	  present	  to	  qualify	  for	  the	  definition	  of	  effective	  I	  will	  use.	  The	  ability	  of	  a	  government	  to	  provide	  these	  services,	  such	  as	  security	  and	  protection,	  means	  that	  the	  government	  maintains	  the	  monopoly	  on	  violence.	  Citizens	  who	  feel	  protected	  by	  there	  government	  will	  not	  turn	  to	  local	  or	  regional	  leaders	  such	  as	  gang	  leaders	  for	  protection.	  An	  easy	  way	  to	  prevent	  threats	  to	  the	  government’s	  internal	  sovereignty	  is	  to	  provide	  forms	  of	  protection	  that	  deter	  citizens	  from	  seeking	  it	  elsewhere.	  Forging	  a	  dependent	  relationship	  with	  the	  people	  of	  a	  country	  allows	  a	  government	  to	  stay	  in	  power	  and	  remain	  relatively	  stable.	  I	  would	  measure	  effective	  internal	  governance	  in	  a	  few	  ways.	  I	  would	  look	  at	  the	  levels	  of	  political	  efficacy	  by	  evaluating	  attitudes	  of	  the	  media	  towards	  the	  government.	  An	  issue	  I	  could	  run	  into	  is	  government-­‐controlled	  media,	  but	  I	  would	  try	  to	  look	  at	  non-­‐government-­‐controlled	  media	  including	  opinions	  and	  attitudes	  expressed	  through	  social	  media.	  To	  add	  to	  my	  study	  of	  political	  efficacy,	  I	  would	  conduct	  a	  random	  survey	  of	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  government	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  govern	  (provide	  necessary	  services).	  I	  would	  evaluate	  reported	  civil	  rights	  abuses	  if	  such	  information	  is	  available,	  keeping	  in	  mind	  that	  many	  instances	  often	  go	  unreported.	  On	  my	  survey,	  I	  would	  ask	  if	  people	  feel	  protected	  by	  police	  and	  military	  or	  threatened	  by	  them.	  I	  would	  ask	  about	  taxation	  levels	  and	  reciprocity	  of	  government	  services	  for	  the	  level	  of	  taxes	  paid.	  Finally,	  I	  would	  evaluate	  the	  constitution,	  if	  one	  is	  present,	  and	  ask	  in	  my	  survey	  if	  people	  feel	  that	  the	  government	  acts	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  law	  set	  forth	  by	  the	  government.	  To	  avoid	  democratic	  bias,	  I	  would	  not	  compare	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  government	  to	  be	  transparent	  but	  act	  according	  to	  the	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law	  set	  forth.	  If	  a	  law	  gives	  most	  of	  the	  power	  to	  one	  position,	  and	  the	  person	  in	  that	  position	  exercises	  those	  powers,	  he	  or	  she	  acts	  according	  to	  the	  law.	  If	  no	  checks	  and	  balances	  exist	  within	  the	  constitution	  or	  in	  codified	  law,	  a	  lack	  of	  checks	  of	  balances	  in	  the	  government	  demonstrates	  adherence	  to	  the	  document.	  It	  does	  not	  necessarily	  demonstrate	  instability.	  	  Finally,	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  post-­‐Soviet	  hybrid-­‐regimes	  with	  power	  in	  the	  international	  arena	  are	  more	  stable.	  Power	  at	  the	  international	  level	  encompasses	  the	  ability	  to	  provide	  security	  from	  international	  forces	  and	  threats,	  to	  advocate	  for	  a	  country’s	  rights,	  and	  to	  pursue	  the	  countries	  interests	  abroad.	  Protecting	  a	  country’s	  sovereignty	  while	  pursuing	  membership	  in	  international	  organizations	  such	  as	  NATO	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  requires	  a	  good	  level	  of	  stability	  as	  well	  as	  an	  adept	  leader.	  If	  a	  country	  can	  navigate	  within	  and	  prosper	  from	  the	  international	  economic	  arena,	  its	  own	  economy	  must	  have	  some	  sort	  of	  stability	  to	  attract	  international	  business.	  The	  way	  in	  which	  I	  would	  measure	  a	  country’s	  power	  at	  the	  international	  level	  is	  by	  looking	  at	  current	  trade	  agreements,	  imports	  and	  exports,	  membership	  (or	  lack	  of)	  in	  international	  organizations,	  the	  presence	  of	  multinational	  corporations,	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  effective	  military.	  The	  presence	  of	  current	  trade	  agreements	  signifies	  that	  another	  country	  has	  faith	  in	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  country	  and	  in	  the	  power	  of	  the	  government	  to	  follow	  through	  with	  an	  agreement.	  If	  a	  country	  mostly	  imports	  goods,	  it	  is	  highly	  dependent	  on	  other	  countries,	  which	  could	  result	  in	  a	  threat	  to	  sovereignty.	  A	  high	  number	  of	  exports	  could	  signify	  exploitation	  of	  resources	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  another	  country.	  It	  could	  also	  signify	  a	  high	  demand	  for	  certain	  products.	  A	  balance	  between	  the	  two	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  government	  possesses	  the	  ability	  to	  protect	  the	  country	  from	  external	  exploitation	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as	  well	  as	  unwanted	  dependency	  on	  other	  countries.	  If	  a	  country	  belongs	  to	  an	  international	  group	  or	  organization,	  it	  means	  they	  qualify	  for	  membership	  requirements.	  It	  also	  means	  that	  other	  countries	  believe	  in	  and	  depend	  on	  the	  continuation	  of	  a	  country	  and	  more	  specifically,	  the	  continuation	  of	  a	  regime.	  However,	  should	  a	  country	  not	  belong	  to	  an	  international	  organization	  (perhaps	  it	  failed	  to	  meet	  certain	  qualifications),	  it	  could	  signify	  a	  lack	  of	  faith	  in	  the	  international	  community	  in	  the	  country	  in	  question.	  It	  could	  also	  mean	  that	  the	  country	  failed	  in	  its	  pursuit	  of	  interests	  on	  an	  international	  scale.	  Multinational	  corporations	  tend	  to	  extend	  and	  expand	  their	  business	  to	  countries	  where	  they	  will	  gain	  the	  most	  business.	  If	  a	  country	  is	  unstable,	  multinational	  corporations	  will	  steer	  clear	  of	  that	  country	  seeing	  it	  unsuitable	  to	  their	  interests.	  Finally,	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  effective	  (well-­‐trained	  and	  well-­‐armed)	  military	  within	  a	  country	  signifies	  that	  the	  government	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  protect	  their	  country	  from	  foreign	  invasion.	  I	  could	  also	  look	  for	  any	  alliances	  with	  other	  countries.	  Their	  presence	  would	  demonstrate,	  again,	  faith	  in	  a	  country’s	  stability	  and	  ability	  to	  be	  a	  strong	  ally	  against	  an	  enemy.	  	  
Case	  Selection:	  Russia,	  Ukraine,	  and	  Georgia	  
	  	   For	  this	  study,	  I	  would	  select	  Russia,	  Ukraine	  and	  Georgia.	  I	  selected	  these	  countries	  due	  to	  their	  similar	  history,	  their	  close	  relationships	  with	  each	  other,	  and	  their	  close	  proximity.	  Each	  country	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  post-­‐Soviet	  country,	  but	  also	  shared	  similar	  experiences	  during	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Each	  country	  gained	  their	  independence	  at	  relatively	  the	  same	  time.	  All	  three	  have	  had	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  time	  to	  develop	  and	  evolve.	  The	  difference	  in	  these	  three	  countries	  is	  size	  and	  their	  relations	  with	  the	  West.	  In	  an	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attempt	  to	  control	  for	  location,	  I	  selected	  close	  countries.	  I	  also	  selected	  these	  countries	  due	  to	  their	  similar	  culture	  and	  political	  structure,	  so	  that	  I	  could	  look	  at	  the	  differences	  between	  them	  to	  determine	  if	  my	  variables	  do	  indeed	  contribute	  to	  their	  stability.	  With	  the	  recent	  tension	  between	  Ukraine	  and	  Russia	  over	  the	  territory	  of	  Crimea,	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  how	  well	  each	  country	  can	  navigate	  the	  international	  playing	  field	  as	  well	  as	  maintain	  a	  stable	  internal	  state.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  
	  	   My	  research	  would	  contribute	  to	  hybrid-­‐regime	  research	  in	  that	  it	  would	  provide	  detailed	  information	  about	  the	  components	  within	  three	  major	  hybrid-­‐regimes.	  We	  would	  be	  able	  to	  see	  trends	  and	  similarities	  between	  the	  regimes,	  which	  could	  mean	  that	  they	  are	  commonly	  found	  within	  them.	  Or	  perhaps	  the	  components	  of	  each	  regime	  will	  differ	  greatly	  meaning	  that	  the	  elements	  within	  the	  regime	  are	  particular	  to	  certain	  ones	  and	  not	  others.	  We	  will	  find	  out	  if	  civil	  society,	  effective	  governance	  and	  international	  power	  do,	  in	  fact,	  contribute	  to	  hybrid-­‐regime	  stability.	  Completing	  this	  study	  is	  incredibly	  important	  if	  we	  are	  to	  have	  future	  relations	  with	  these	  countries.	  Policy	  makers	  and	  government	  officials	  cannot	  do	  their	  job	  effectively	  if	  they	  lack	  crucial	  details	  about	  what	  makes	  a	  state	  “run”	  and	  what	  keeps	  it	  running	  well.	  As	  these	  systems	  develop	  and	  grow,	  the	  potential	  to	  learn	  also	  grows,	  as	  does	  the	  need	  for	  information.	  How	  can	  people,	  from	  diplomats	  to	  travelers,	  know	  how	  to	  recognize	  a	  state	  as	  volatile	  or	  stable	  if	  we	  have	  no	  idea	  what	  makes	  that	  state	  stable?	  My	  research	  would	  lay	  important	  groundwork	  for	  further	  study	  of	  these	  regimes’	  institutions	  and	  behavior.	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   When	  designing	  this	  study,	  I	  ran	  into	  many	  other	  potential	  areas	  of	  scholarship	  such	  as	  how	  to	  define	  hybrid-­‐regimes,	  if	  there	  are	  different	  types	  of	  hybrid-­‐regimes	  such	  as	  subcategories,	  how	  relations	  between	  post-­‐Soviet	  states	  compare	  to	  relations	  between	  post-­‐Soviet	  and	  Western	  states,	  and	  how	  to	  potentially	  restructure	  the	  way	  in	  which	  political	  scientists	  categorize	  regimes.	  Truly,	  the	  potential	  for	  further	  study	  in	  this	  area	  is	  endless	  and	  would	  be	  invaluable	  to	  future	  political	  and	  economic	  relations	  with	  these	  countries.	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